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ABSTRACT 
The government runs a program to develop a technologically advanced weapon 
system. In the competition phase, the government provides initial funding to several 
defense contractors to develop system prototypes. Based on the demonstration of these 
prototypes, the government selects one defense contractor as the sole source to produce 
the final product. We develop a mathematical model to describe this process. By 
analyzing the model and conducting a numerical study, we find three main reasons why 
such a program often suffers delay and cost overrun. First, the selected contractor tends to 
be luckier than usual in the competition phase, so the government tends to overestimate 
its capability. Second, once a contractor becomes the sole source, their goal is to 
complete the scheduled tasks within each fiscal year on time, but not to deliver the final 
product as soon as possible. Third, the contractor may be motivated to exert extra effort 
during the competition phase in order to improve their chance of getting selected as the 
sole source, which may result in an overly optimistic estimation on program completion 
time. Based on a cost structure, our model offers recommendations on the optimal length 
of the competition phase and the number of contractors to invite, in order to minimize the 
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Executive Summary
The pricing models in the defense industry cannot rely on basic economic principles,
such as supply and demand, since it involves advanced technology that is pertinent
to national security. The cost estimation of developing a technologically advanced
weapon system is typically done based on component cost, labor cost, inflation, cost to
acquire new technology, and opinions of subject matter experts. Since not all necessary
technologies are in place at the onset of the system development, there is a lot of
uncertainty in the total program cost and completion time. If a technological hurdle
cannot be overcome in time, the whole program may su↵er substantial delay and cost
overrun.
Besides technological uncertainty, developing a technologically advanced weapon
system also involves a lot of political uncertainty. The budget needs to be approved
on a yearly basis and sometimes a program may get cancelled. This uncertainty puts
pressure on defense contractors to secure sole-source contracts when competing against
other contractors. Once becoming a sole-source contractor, however, the contractor’s
main motivation is to complete the scheduled tasks on time in each fiscal year, but not
to deliver the final product as soon as possible.
This study aims to develop a mathematical model to describe the interactions
between defense contractors and the government, in order to estimate the cost and
schedule for developing a technologically advanced weapon system. The research goal
is twofold: (1) explain why the development of a new weapon system is often subject
to cost overrun and schedule delay; and (2) identify market mechanisms to improve
the e ciency of the bidding and contracting process in order to better manage risk.
To achieve these goals, we develop a mathematical model in which the government
manages a program to develop a technologically advanced weapon system in two phases:
the competition phase and the sole-source phase. Both phases consist of three steps,
which are described below.
1. The government funds a few defense contractors to develop a prototype for a
technologically advanced weapon system in the competition phase. At the end of
the competition phase, the government selects a sole source to develop the final
product.
2. Each contractor may or may not be motivated to exert extra e↵ort in the compe-
tition phase in order to improve their chance of winning the sole-source contract.
3. At the end of the competition phase, each contractor demonstrates their prod-
uct prototype. The quality of the prototype depends on the contractor’s design
capability and also their luck in overcoming technological hurdles.
4. Based on the prototype demonstration, the government selects a sole-source con-
tractor to develop a final product. The program enters the sole-source phase.
5. The sole-source contractor continues to develop the weapon system. The progress
may be a↵ected by fiscal-year budget constraints, as well as the contractor’s
capability and luck in overcoming technological hurdles.
6. The government’s payo↵ depends on the total program cost and program comple-
tion time. The government prefers to spend less money and complete the program
sooner.
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By using probabilistic modeling to capture the uncertainty of developing a techno-
logically advanced weapon system, we are able to quantify the e↵ect of several model
parameters on the eventual program cost and completion time. After analyzing the
model, we run a simulation study to gain insights into the entire process and identify
three main reasons why such a program often su↵ers cost overrun and schedule delay.
1. The selected contractor tends to be luckier than usual in the competition phase,
so the government tends to overestimate the contractor’s capability.
2. Once a contractor becomes the sole source, their goal is to complete the scheduled
tasks within each fiscal year on time, but not to deliver the final product as soon
as possible.
3. The contractor may be motivated to exert extra e↵ort during the competition
phase in order to improve their chance of getting selected as the sole source,
which may result in an overly optimistic estimation on program completion time.
Based on a cost structure, our model o↵ers recommendation on the optimal length of
the competition phase, and the number of contractors to invite, in order to minimize
the program completion time and total cost.
Our model assumes that the government announces the length of the competition
phase in advance, and selects one contractor at the conclusion of the competition phase.
An alternative approach is to review each contractor’s progress on a yearly basis and
decide which contractors to fund for another year. In addition, if the government has
some prior knowledge about each contractor’s capability, then a Bayesian approach
may produce a more reliable estimate on the program completion time. A separate
study is needed to explore these issues.
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1 Introduction
Because building an aviation system, such as FA-18, MH-60, and F-35 aircraft, in-
volves advanced technology pertinent to national security, the pricing of such aviation
systems primarily relies on estimating the cost to build the system, as opposed to
basic economic principles such as supply and demand. There are only a handful of de-
fense contractors that are capable of building such aviation systems—such as Boeing,
Northrop Grumman, and Lockheed Martin. On the demand side, the only major buyer
of these aviation systems is the United States Government. Whereas it is possible to
sell these aviation systems to foreign governments, any such transactions need to be
approved by the U.S. Government.
On the surface, the market resembles a monopsony, where there is only one buyer
(the U.S. Government) in the market with several suppliers (defense contractors) o↵er-
ing similar products. Upon a closer look, however, the market also shares a lot of sim-
ilarities with a monopoly, since once an aviation system is selected for production, the
selected defense contractor becomes the only supplier. For instance, after the Lockheed
Martin F-35 was selected over the Boeing X-32 in the Joint Strike Fighter program,
Lockheed Martin enjoyed monopolistic power to manufacture the next-generation mul-
tipurpose fighter jets. As a consequence, the entire procurement process is vulnerable
to many market ine ciencies shared by monopoly and monopsony.
This project aims to develop a mathematical model to describe the relationships
among the stakeholders in the defense industry, focusing on the U.S. Government
and major defense contractors. The research goal is twofold: (1) explain why the
development and manufacturing of advanced aviation systems are often subject to
program cost increases and delays; and (2) identify market mechanisms to improve the
e ciency of the bidding and contracting process in order to better manage risk.
The rest of this report proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant litera-
ture. Section 3 develops a mathematical model to describe the relationship between
the government and major defense contractors. Section 4 analyzes the competition
phase, while Section 5 analyzes the sole-source phase. Section 6 presents an extensive
numerical study. Finally, Section 7 concludes the report.
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2 Literature Review
Sapolsky, Gholz, and Talmadge (2013) provides a comprehensive overview of U.S.
defense politics. It discusses America’s security strategy, the political economy of
defense and the weapons acquisition process, among others. It o↵ers many interesting
observations and their plausible explanations in the U.S. defense industry.
There are two main reasons why cost is di cult to project for major weapons
systems acquisition:
1. Technological uncertainty: The Department of Defense (DoD) requests weapon
systems that require future technology. When the contracts are awarded, typically
not all the technologies required to build the systems are in place.
2. Political uncertainty: The U.S. budget needs to be approved on a yearly basis.
Each year, the congress may decide whether to push forward a project, postpone
it, or cancel it. This uncertainty puts pressure on defense contractors to win
contracts against competition by o↵ering favorable bids that may not be entirely
realistic.
Sapolsky et al. (2013) further o↵er many observations to support their arguments.
1. The U.S. defense industry has production overcapacity. A lot of mergers and
acquisitions happened in the late 90s; however, with fewer major contractors, the
production capacity remains roughly the same. There are still six shipyards and
more plants building military aircraft and armored vehicles. Defense contractors
want to lobby for a line in the defense budget to keep the plan running, while
congressional members have an interest in preserving employment in their respec-
tive districts. Keeping production of current weapon systems partially reduces
the contractors’ motivation and ability to invest in research and development.
2. The defense budget is reviewed on a yearly basis, and goes up and down through
cycles. The armed services have incentive to push a weapon system into produc-
tion before it is fully developed (such as B-1 bomber of the Air Force), when the
defense budget allows. It is easier to get additional funding to fix a problem once
the production has started, if the defense budget goes through a downturn in the
following years.
3. Defense is like no other business in its forgiveness of cost overruns and time
slippages. There is no immediate consequence to national security if the new
systems are not deployed on schedule, as long as new threats have not emerged.
4. Defense projects depend on two di↵erent kinds of support: military requirements
(severity of national security threats) and congressional votes (constituent inter-
ests and lobbying). When the threats are perceived less salient, lobbying and
pork-barrel politics play a more important role in the political economy of de-
fense.
5. The Navy uses smaller contractors to build a large number of small, inexpensive
surface combatants. By letting smaller players into the defense business, the
Navy gained more yards to feed: Adding new, small players is much easier than
driving the big players away. The small players will learn that it is easier to
lobby the government for follow-on projects, each promising billions of dollars in
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future revenues, than it is to go hunting for low-cost commercial deals for which
lower-cost overseas yards will complete. The result is the problem of production
overcapacity.
6. Projects with foreign partners are harder to terminate. The Joint Strike Fighter
has an extra wall around it because Britain, Australia, Canada, Italy, and several
other allies have not only promised to buy the aircraft, but have contributed funds
to its development.
Gholz and Sapolsky (1999) studied the U.S. defense industry in the late 1990s.
During the Cold War, the U.S. defense buildup led many contractors to invest in huge
production capacity, which was no longer needed after the Cold War ended in 1989.
In the 1990s, some contractors were forced out of business and some were merged,
but the production capacity remained roughly the same throughout this process. This
overcapacity puts a lot of pressure on defense contractors to secure funding. If two
projects are awarded to the same contractor, where the success of the first project has
potential to attract additional funding, while the success of the second project does
not, then it is conceivable that the contractor is motivated to exert more e↵ort on the
first project.
Besides aforementioned studies on the defense industry, Augustine (1997) discusses
reshaping the defense industry by studying Lockheed Martin’s survival story. Blair and
Harrison (2010) present monopsony in law and economics. Guay and Callum (2002)
study the Europe’s defense industry and how it was a↵ected by the changes in the U.S.
defense industry.
There is a lot of work on cost estimation in the literature, such as Garvey (2000)
and Stewart (1991). In particular, Mislick and Nussbaum (2015) discuss many methods
that are applicable to projects managed by the DoD. However, cost estimation for
long-term, high-technology, high-risk projects has not been addressed adequately in
the literature. Brown, Grose, and Koyak (2006) study this specific problem, where the
task durations and costs may increase over time. They use U.S. Army Future Combat
Systems as the motivating application and compare di↵erent scheduling plans, based on
the risk assessment of each task. While these earlier works assume that it is possible
to objectively quantify the duration of each task by a probability distribution, our
model requires the government to estimate them in real time, and accounts for how
contractors might be motivated to a↵ect this estimation.
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3 The Models
This section develops a model for the development of a technologically advanced
weapon system. We first present a descriptive model in Section 3.1, via an influ-
ence diagram, and then introduce assumptions on the descriptive model to produce a
mathematical model in Section 3.2.
3.1 A Descriptive Model
We break the entire process of weapon system development into six steps, as shown in
an influence diagram in Figure 1. In steps 1–3, the government funds several contractors
to develop system prototypes. In steps 4–6, the government selects one contractor to





















Figure 1: An influence diagram for new weapon systems development and acquisition process.
1. There are a few (typically two or three) defense contractors invited to develop a
technologically advanced weapon system. The government provides funding to
each contractor for research and development, and will select a sole source after
a period of time (typically 3–7 years).
2. Each contractor may decide to add its own funds (or e↵ort) to the development
the system prototype, or they may be prohibited from doing so (such as the
case of the Joint Strike Fighter program). The research funds—whether from the
government or the contractor’s own—directly a↵ects the R&D results.
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3. When the competition phase completes, each contractor is required to demon-
strate their research results, perhaps via a prototype of the system. A contractor
is more likely to produce a more promising prototype if the contractor is more
capable than the other contractors (better design team), or if the contractor ex-
erts more e↵ort; but, there is no guarantee, since the research process involves a
lot of technological risk.
4. Based on the prototype demonstration, the government (Congress and DoD)
then selects a sole source to further develop the weapon system. Typically, the
government selects the contractor whose prototype looks most promising and
whose projected time to completion is the shortest.
5. At the time of sole source selection, the actual time to program completion and
the actual total cost are random variables. After further development, the actual
time to completion and total cost are revealed.
6. The payo↵ for the government depends on the total program cost and the total
time to program completion. The government prefers to spend less money and
complete the program sooner.
3.2 A Mathematical Model
We next introduce mathematical model assumptions for the descriptive model in Fig-
ure 1. The assumptions made at each node are summarized below.
1. A project to develop a technologically advanced weapon system includes many
routine tasks whose time and cost are straightforward to estimate, as well as
many research tasks that bear a lot of risk. To model the risky research tasks,
we assume that a project consists of m technical steps, and a contractor has a
maximal capable rate   to complete these technical steps. By working at rate  ,
the expected amount of time required to complete the next technical step is 1/ ,
but the actual amount of time follows an exponential distribution. Therefore,
the time it takes to complete the project (all m technical steps) follows a gamma
distribution, with shape parameter m and rate parameter  . The parameters  
and m can be chosen to fit the assessment from subject matter experts at the
onset of the project.
The government’s program to develop a technologically advanced weapon system
consists of two phases: the competition phase and the sole-source phase. In the
competition phase, the government decides on n, the number of contractors to
fund (typically n = 2 or 3). The government does not know the ability of each
contractor; in other words, the government does not know each contractor’s actual
maximal capable rate. In the competition phase, the government provides funds
for these contractors, with the idea that only the best-performing contractor
during the competition phase will be selected to receive continual funding to
complete the project in the sole-source phase.
2. In the competition phase, each contractor has strong motivation to work at its
maximal capable rate in order to maximize their chance of getting selected by
the government for the sole-source phase. It is also conceivable that a contractor
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will be motivated to exert extra e↵ort to help improve their chance of getting
selected. To model this potential behavior, we suppose that in the competition
phase, each contractor works at a rate (1 + ↵) . The parameter ↵   0 models
a contractor’s motivation in the competition phase. In our numerical study, we
will test ↵ = 0%, 5%, 10%.
3. At the conclusion of the competition phase, each contractor is required to demon-
strate their progress. Research and development is inherently a risky process. A
contractor is more likely to deliver a better prototype, if they are more capable
(larger maximal capable rate  ) or exerts more e↵ort (larger extra e↵ort ↵), but
there is no guarantee. A less-capable contractor may get lucky and end up pro-
ducing the best prototype. We assume that at the end of the competition phase,
each contractor reveals the number of technical steps they completed during the
competition phase.
4. At the conclusion of the competition phase, the government will examine the
progress of each contractor. For instance, for the Joint Strike Fighter program,
the government assessed Boeing and Lockheed Martin after five years (1996–
2001) via prototype demonstration. By assessing how many technical steps each
contractor has accomplished in the competition phase, the government estimates
how much longer it will take for each contractor to complete the project. The
government selects the project whose expected time to completion is the soonest,
and commits to funding the project through its fruition. The program thus enters
the sole-source phase.
5. In the sole-source phase, the contractor enters into a multiyear contract with
the government. The idea is for the government to fund the project through
its fruition; but, in reality, the government’s budget is appropriated annually for
each fiscal year that begins on 1 October and ends on 30 September the next
year. Based on the demonstration of the contractor’s prototype, the government
and the contractor negotiate a contracting period of performance that specifies
the statement of work in each year. In our model, we assume that the technical
steps yet to be completed are divided across multiple fiscal years, based on the
completion rate demonstrated by the contractor during the competition phase. In
reality, after each fiscal year, the term of the contract can be renegotiated if there
is a delay, and if the Congress does not approve the new budget, the government
has the power to cancel the project.
If a contractor gets selected for the sole-source phase, then the contractor need not
always work at its maximal capable rate. In most government contracts, finishing
the project ahead of schedule or under budget does not get rewarded. Instead,
finishing ahead of time results in less work for the contractor and its employees.
In addition, it may be perceived as having requested more money than actually
needed, which may hurt the contractor’s ability to negotiate a budget for other
projects in the future. Consequently, the contractor’s goal is to finish the project
right on time, but not as soon as possible. A small delay is not ideal, but it is
often tolerable, and in many cases can be a better outcome than finishing the
project ahead of time from the contractor’s standpoint. For these reasons, we
assume that during the sole-source phase, the selected contractor will work at a
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rate such that they expect to complete all technical steps assigned to the current
fiscal year at the end of the fiscal year, but no higher than their maximal capable
rate. In other words, if during a fiscal year the project gets ahead of schedule,
then the progress tends to slow down. If the project is behind schedule, then the
contractor will work at their maximal capable rate in order to catch up with the
schedule.
6. The government has two goals: (1) minimize the amount of money spent to have
a completed project; and (2) minimize the time it takes to have a completed
project. On one extreme, if the government sets the length of the competition
phase to infinity, then the government funds all n projects until one completes,
which will achieve goal (2), but not (1). On the other extreme, if the government
sets the length of the competition phase to zero, then the government funds only
one contractor from the onset, which is unlikely to achieve either (1) or (2), since
the government does not benefit from the competition between contractors. By
choosing the appropriate length of the competition phase, the government can
learn about each contractor’s design approach by observing what is accomplished
in the competition phase, so as to improve the chance of selecting the best con-
tractor design. The contractors are also motivated to work at their respective
maximal capable rates in order to increase the chance of getting selected for the
sole-source phase, which, in turn, shortens the program completion time.
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4 The Sole-Source Phase
This section presents a model on how a project progresses after the government commits
to funding the project through its fruition. The contractor that is awarded the project
faces no competition. The project may be planned for multiple fiscal years, with a
certain number of technical steps scheduled for each fiscal year.
4.1 One-Year Project
We first consider a project that is scheduled and funded within a single fiscal year,
with the period of performance denoted by t 2 [0, 1] year. Recall that in our model,
the contractor can work at a maximal capable rate  . Let m denote the number of
technical steps required to complete the project.
As discussed earlier, a sole-source contractor’s goal is to complete the project on
time, but not ahead of schedule. To model this behavior, we assume that the con-
tractor will work at his maximal capable rate  , if such rate will result in an expected
completion time later than the deadline. In other words, if the project falls behind
schedule, then the contractor will work as hard as it can to catch up with the schedule.
However, if the project gets ahead of schedule at any time point, then the contractor
will work at a rate that gives the expected completion time exactly equal to the project
deadline, so as to finish the project on time, but not ahead of time.
Suppose at a time point, the project still has m technical steps to go, with t time
units left. If m/  > t (behind schedule), then the contractor works at an instantaneous
rate equal to his maximal capable rate  ; if m/   t (ahead of schedule), then the
contractor works at a reduced ratem/t so that the expected time to completion matches
the deadline t, but is not ahead of it. The contractor changes the rate continuously
until the project completes.
Write X for the time to complete the next technical step, when the project still
has m technical steps to go, with t time units left. If m/  > t, then X follows an
exponential distribution with rate  . If m/  < t, then the instantaneous hazard rate
(at completing the next technical step) of X is given by
r(x) =
⇢ m
t x , x < t  m  ;
 , x > t  m  .
For x < t m/ , we can compute





















Because conditional on X > t m/ , the additional time to complete the next technical










e  (x (t m/ )), x > t  m  .
(1)
For given  , m, and t, we are interested in two random quantities: (1) the time it
takes to complete the project, denoted by T , and (2) the number of technical steps that
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are yet completed by the deadline, denoted by N . We first present analytical solutions
for two special cases and then discuss how to use Monte Carlo simulation to estimate
these two quantities in general.
4.1.1 Special Case m = 1
Consider the special case where m = 1, so that there is just one more technical step left
to complete the project. If t < 1/ , the contractor will work at its maximal capable
rate  , so that the time to completion T follows an exponential distribution with rate
 . Therefore, E[T ] = 1/ , and Var(T ) = 1/ 2; the expected delay is E[T ] t = 1/  t.
In addition, the probability of completing the project on time is P (N = 0) = P (T <
t) = 1  e  t, and the probability that there remains one technical step unresolved at
the deadline is P (N = 1) = e  t.
If t > 1/ , then the distribution of the time needed to complete the final technical
step, denoted by X, is given by Equation (1) with m = 1. In addition, since there is


















In addition, since (X|X < t   1/ ) follows a uniform distribution over (0, t   1/ ),
and (X|X > t  1/ ) is distributed as the sum of t  1/  and an exponential random
variable having rate  , we obtain
E










































By conditioning on whether X < t  1/ , we can compute
E[X] = P
✓





































































































The expected delay is therefore









The probability that the project will be completed by the deadline is
P (N = 0) = 1  1
 t
e 1,
which follows from Equation (1) withm = 1 and x = t. In other words, with probability
P (N = 1) = e 1/( t), there will be one technical step unresolved at the deadline.
4.1.2 Special Case t < 1/ 
Once the deadline is within 1/  year, the contractor will work at its maximal capable
rate   for the remainder of the project. The time to complete m technical steps,
namely T , follows a gamma distribution with shape parameter m and rate parameter
 , so E[T ] = m/ , and Var(T ) = m/ 2.
Since the contractor works at the same rate   for the remainder of the project, the
time points at which the technical steps are completed constitute a Poisson process with
rate  —until all m technical steps are completed. The probability that the contractor













the contractor will complete all m technical steps within t time units (before the dead-
line). Therefore, we can conclude that







P (N = i) = e  t
( t)m i
(m  i)! , i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
4.1.3 Simulation Method
Other than the two special cases just discussed, we need to use Monte Carlo simulation
to estimate the two quantities of interest: (1) the time it takes to complete the project
and (2) the number of technical steps still unresolved at the deadline. To simulate the
project’s progress, we first generate a random variable X, which is the time required
to complete the next technical step, according to the distribution given in (1).
1. Generate u U(0, 1).
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2. If u < (m t)
m, then X > t m/ . Use an exponential distribution with rate   to
generate Y , and set
X  t  m
 
+ Y.
3. If u > (m t)
m, then X < t m/ . Set
X  t(1  u1/m).
After generating X, we can compute the remaining time t X, at which point the
contractor completes one technical step, and the number of unresolved technical steps
becomes m   1. If t   X < 1/ , or if m   1 = 1, then the situation becomes one
of the two special cases, so we can use the analytic solution as the simulation output.
Otherwise, we can continue to generate the time it takes to complete the next technical
step.
If X > t, then no technical step is completed before the deadline. Although we can
use that as the simulation output, it is possible to make the simulation more e cient by
using a variance reduction technique known as the conditional estimator. Specifically,
we can move the time clock to 1/  before the deadline and consider the situation,
where there are still m technical steps yet to be resolved with 1/  (fractional) year
before deadline. Since the situation is identical to what is discussed in Section 4.1.2,
we can use the analytical solution as the simulation output, as opposed to simulating
the rest of the process.
Now, suppose that we have perform n independent simulation runs. Let µi denote
the estimate of E[T ], and  2i the estimate of Var(T ), obtained in the ith simulation
















This section develops a model for a project’s progress if it is funded through multiple
fiscal years. In a multiyear project, the statement of work typically specifies the number
of technical steps that will be completed each year. Suppose that there are still m
technical steps to be completed and the number of technical steps scheduled to be
completed in each fiscal year is r, where r is a positive integer. The multiyear project
is then scheduled for m/r years. If m/r is not an integer, then the project is scheduled
for bm/rc full fiscal years and an additional m/r   bm/rc (fractional) year.
In the first year, the goal of the contractor is to complete r technical steps of the
project. If it completes r technical steps early, there is no motivation for the contractor
to continue working on technical steps originally planned for the next year. For the
same reasons as discussed in Section 4.1, the contractor tends to slow down when they
are ahead of schedule, so that they can meet the year-end goal as closely as possible. If
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the contractor does finish all the r technical steps allocated in this first year, then we
assume that the contractor will work on the nontechnical aspects of the project for the
remainder of the fiscal year, and resume working on technical steps at the beginning of
the next fiscal year. In this model, the number of technical steps that will be completed
within the first fiscal year is a random variable and we can use the model in Section 4.1
to determine its distribution.
If all r technical steps planned for the first fiscal year are completed on time, then
the same process repeats for the second fiscal year for the next r technical steps. If
only b < r technical steps are completed in the first fiscal year, then the project falls
behind. At the beginning of the second fiscal year, the project still requires another
m b technical steps, and the projected completion time will be pushed back by (r b)/r
year. Typically, the contractor can find some justification for a small delay, such as
running into unexpected technical challenges, and revise the schedule. The goal of the
second fiscal year is still to complete r technical steps, and the same process repeats
after each fiscal year. The government may accept the new schedule, or it may decide
to cancel the project altogether.
If, at the beginning of a fiscal year, the number of remaining technical steps drops
to r or below, then the project enters its final fiscal year, which is precisely the case
discussed in Section 4.1.
For given  , m, and r, we are interested in two random variables: (1) the time it
takes to complete the project, denoted by T , and (2) the number of technical steps that
are yet completed by the original deadline (in m/r years), denoted by N . We discuss
how to use Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the expected value and the variance of
these two random variables.
4.2.1 Time Needed to Complete the Project
Let Tk denote the time it takes to complete the project at the beginning of a fiscal
year, if there are still k technical steps left. If k  r, then E[Tk] can be estimated
by simulation, as discussed in Section 4.1. If k > r, then r technical steps will be
planned for the next fiscal year. Write Z for the number of technical steps that will be
completed in a year, if r technical steps are planned at the beginning of the year. The
distribution of Z can be estimated by simulation, as discussed in Section 4.1.
By conditioning on the number of technical steps completed in the next fiscal year,
we can write
E[Tk] = 1 +
rX
i=0
P (Z = i) · E[Tk i].




i=1 P (Z = i) · E[Tk i]
1  P (Z = 0) ,
which can be used to compute E[Tk] recursively, for k = r + 1, r + 2, . . ..
We next describe how to estimate Var(Tk). If k  r, then Var(Tk) can be estimated
by simulation, as discussed in Section 4.1. If k > r, then recall that r technical steps
will be planned for the next fiscal year and we write Z for the number of technical
14
steps that will be completed during the year. To compute Var(Tk), we condition on Z
and use the formula
Var(Tk) = E[Var(Tk|Z)] + Var(E[Tk|Z]). (2)
First, note that
Var(Tk|Z = i) = Var(Tk i),
since, at the beginning of the next fiscal year, there are still k   i technical steps yet








Var(Tk i) · P (Z = i)
= Var(Tk) · P (Z = 0) +
rX
i=1
Var(Tk i) · P (Z = i). (3)








(1 + E[Tk i]  E[Tk])2 · P (Z = i). (4)
Use Equations (3) and (4) in Equation (2), and solve for Var(Tk) to obtain
Var(Tk) =
Pr
i=1Var(Tk i) · P (Z = i) +
Pr
i=0(1 + E[Tk i]  E[Tk])2 · P (Z = i)
1  P (Z = 0) ,
which can be used to compute Var(Tk) recursively, for k = r + 1, r + 2, . . ..
4.2.2 Progress at the Deadline
The second performance measure is the progress of the project at the original deadline.
Let N denote the number of technical steps yet to be completed at the deadline.
If N = 0, then the project completes on time; otherwise, the project does not get
completed on time.
Recall that in a multiyear project, there are three parameters: the total number of
technical steps that need to be completed m, the number of technical steps planned
for each fiscal year r, and the contractor’s maximal capable rate to complete technical
steps  . If m/r is an integer, then the deadline of the project falls at the end of a
fiscal year. Recall that Z stands for the random number of technical steps that will
be completed in each year, so the m/r-fold convolution of Z gives the distribution
of the number of technical steps completed in m/r years, which, in turn, yields the
distribution of N .
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Now, suppose that m/r is not an integer. After bm/rc fiscal years, we want to
determine the progress of the project after another m/r bm/rc year. In other words,
we need to determine the distribution of the number of technical steps completed
by time m/r   bm/rc, given that d technical steps are planned for t year, where
t   m/r   bm/rc. If the contractor completes r technical steps in each of the first
bm/rc years, then there is no delay, so t = m/r   bm/rc and d = m   r ⇥ bm/rc. If
the project su↵ers any delay, then t > m/r   bm/rc. If the delay is long enough such
that r or more technical steps are yet to be completed after bm/rc years, then t = 1
and d = r.
Consider the situation, where d technical steps are planned for the next t  1 year.
Let N denote the number of technical steps yet to be completed at the time moment
when there is still s year before the deadline. In the other, after the contractor works
for t   s year, the random variable N represents the number of technical steps yet to
be completed at that point.
If t  1/ , then the contractor works at rate  , so that the probability that i













the contractor will complete all d steps in the next t   s year. Therefore, we can
conclude that







P (N = i) = e  (t s)
( (t  s))d i
(d  i)! , i = 1, 2, . . . , d.
Now, suppose t > 1/ . Consider the special case d = 1, so there is only one
technical step left. The distribution of the time to complete the final technical step is
given by Equation (1) with m = 1. If s > 1/ , then






If s < 1/ , then






For d   2, we need to use Monte Carlo simulation to estimate the distribution of N .
First, use Equation (1) to generate the time to complete the next technical step and
denote it by x. If t x < s, then no technical step is completed, so N = d. If t x > s,
then it takes x year to complete one technical step. We can update d  d   1 and
t t  x and repeat the process until either t  1/  or when d = 1; in which case, we
can use the analytic solution in the special cases as the simulation output.
16
5 The Competition Phase
During the competition phase, the government funds n contractors (typically n = 2
or 3). Let  i denote the maximal capable rate of contractor i, i = 1, . . . , n. The
government does not know the exact ability of each contractor; in other words, the
government does not know the actual maximal capable rate of each contractor. At the
end of the competition phase, the government will examine each contractor’s progress,
and use it to estimate the additional time required for each contractor to complete its
project, assuming continual funding support.
Without any additional knowledge about each contractor’s maximal capable rate,
the most sensible way to estimate the project’s completion time is to assume that the
project will progress at the same pace in the future as in the past. That is, if the
contractor completes d technical steps in the competition phase, which has length
t years, then the average time to complete each technical step is t/d. Therefore,
the estimated additional time required to complete another m   d technical steps is
(m   d) ⇥ (t/d) = t(m/d   1). Thus, after the competition phase, the government
selects the contractor with the smallest such value and terminates the funding support
for the other contractors.
Once the government selects a contractor to fund in the sole-source phase, the two
sides need to set up a multiyear contract, which specifies the tasks to be completed in
each fiscal year. Since the contractor completed d technical steps in t years during the
competition phase, we assume that the multiyear contract requires the contractor to
complete bd/tc technical steps in each fiscal year, where bd/tc is the largest integer not
exceeding d/t. As the program enters the sole-source phase, we can use the model in
Section 4 to calculate the progress of the selected project.
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6 Numerical Study
This section presents a set of numerical studies to demonstrate our models to shed lights
on how the program completion time and total program cost are a↵ected by di↵erent
model parameters. Section 6.1 concerns the case without a competition phase, where a
single contractor is selected at the very beginning of the program. Section 6.2 focuses
on symmetric contractors in the sense that all contractors involved in the competition
phase have the same maximal capable rate. The goal is to examine how the length
of the competition phase a↵ects the program completion time and cost. Section 6.3
studies the case where the contractors have di↵erent maximal capable rates. The longer
the competition phase, the more funds are needed in the competition phase, but the
better the chance that the government will be able to award the sole-source contract
to the most-capable contractor.
6.1 The Case without Competition Phase
We first study a program that does not have a competition phase. In other words, the
government selects one contractor to develop the new weapon system from the very
beginning. We set the number of technical steps m = 120 and a nominal program
duration to be 15 years. In other words, the goal is to complete eight technical steps
each year. We use the model in Section 4 to estimate the total program completion
time and the program’s progress after 15 years.
In addition to the completion time of a project, we are also interested in the total
cost to run the program. To do so, we use nominal cost projections provided by N98,
under a nominal schedule of 15 years. The yearly costs to fund one contractor, from
year 1 to year 15—assuming that the project proceeds as scheduled—are given by the
following in million dollars:
c1 = 38.33, c2 = 36.00, c3 = 52.00, c4 = 68.00, c5 = 84.00,
c6 = 487.75, c7 = 992.19, c8 = 1513.74, c9 = 5467.07, c10 = 8020.64,
c11 = 6349.81, c12 = 7247.63, c13 = 8313.25, c14 = 8582.30, c15 = 6973.17.
In reality, the project may not proceed as scheduled and may su↵er delay. If the
actual project completion time is x years, then we assume that the total cost will scale






for the total program cost. Table 1 displays the simulation results by varying the
maximal capable rate   of the contractor, between 7 and 9 technical steps per year.
For each case, the simulation results are based on 400 independent simulation runs
and the standard error of the mean program completion time is within 0.04% of the
estimate.
As seen in Table 1, the mean completion time decreases as   increases, since the
contractor becomes more capable. However, even if   = 9, which is greater than 8—the
number of scheduled technical steps in each year—the project still su↵ers an average
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Table 1: The e↵ect of the maximal capable rate   on the project’s progress, if the program
selects a sole-source contractor from the very beginning. For each case, the results are based
on 400 independent simulation runs, with the standard error of the mean program completion
time within 0.04% of the estimate.
Maximal Completion Progress at the Total Cost
Capable Rate Time (yrs) Deadline (%) (billions)
(per year) Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
7 18.98 1.22 78.8 5.7 68.6 4.4
7.5 18.23 1.08 82.0 5.3 65.9 3.9
8 17.66 0.96 84.6 4.9 63.8 3.5
8.5 17.22 0.86 86.7 4.6 62.3 3.1
9 16.89 0.78 88.4 4.3 61.1 2.8
delay of 16.89 15 = 1.89 years. The reason for this delay is that in each fiscal year, the
contractor can complete, at most, eight technical steps as scheduled. If the contractor
completes eight technical steps ahead of time, it does not have incentive (in some cases,
it is even against the law) to work on the technical steps scheduled for the next fiscal
year. In addition, if in the first six months of a fiscal year, the contractor has already
completed 6 technical steps out of 8 scheduled in the fiscal year, then the contractor
tends to slow down, since they are only motivated to complete the work on time, but
not ahead of time. Consequently, in some fiscal years, the contractor completes fewer
than 8 technical tasks and the delay is inevitable.
The next two columns display the progress of the project at the deadline of 15 years.
With similar reasons, the progress increases, on average, as   increases; however, even
if   = 9, the expected progress after 15 years is still less than 90%. The last two
columns display the total cost to run the program with a sole-source contractor. The
total program cost is higher if the contractor is less capable (smaller maximal capable
rate  ).
6.2 The Case with Symmetric Contractors
This section presents the numerical study, where the n contractors involved in the com-
petition phase have the same maximal capable rate  . As was the case in Section 6.1,
we set the number of technical steps m = 120 and a nominal program duration to be
15 years. Consequently, we use   = 8 for each contractor. If a contractor works at the
maximal capable rate   = 8 at all time, then the time required to complete the project
follows a gamma distribution (bell shape) with expected value 120/8 = 15 years, and
standard deviation
p
120/82 ⇡ 1.37 years.
The government has two decision variables:
1. The number of contractors funded in the competition phase, denoted by n. We
will consider n = 2, 3, 4.
2. The length of the competition phase in years, denoted by t. We will consider
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t = 3, 4, . . . , 10 years.
The government has two objective functions: minimize the expected time to program
completion and minimize the total program cost. These two objectives, however, are
competing, and there will be some trade-o↵ between them. As we vary n = 2, 3, 4
and t = 3, 4, . . . , 10, we run the model in Sections 4 and 5 to estimate the actual
program completion time. In addition, we also estimate the progress at the projected
program completion time, where the projected completion time is estimated based on
the number of technical steps completed in the competition phase.
To compute the program total cost, we consider the cost in the competition phase
and the cost in the sole-source phase separately. Recall from Section 6.1 that the
nominal cost projections for years 1–15 are provided by N98, and we write ci for the
cost in year i, for i = 1, 2, . . . , 15. In the competition phase, the funding cost is fixed.
If the government funds n contractors in the competition phase for t years, then the





In the sole-source phase, however, the actual cost depends on the program completion
time. We estimate the actual cost by assuming that the government will provide
continual funding until the sole-source contractor completes their project. The actual
cost will be less if the project finishes ahead of time, or more if there is a delay. Based






to estimate the program cost in the sole-source phase, where x is the actual program
completion time and t is the length of the competition phase. Consequently, we esti-










where n is the number of contractors involved in the competition phase, t the length
of the competition phase, and x the actual project completion time by the selected
contractor.
Table 2 displays the results, when we vary the number of contractors in the com-
petition phase (namely n), and the length of the competition phase (namely t), based
on 2,000 independent simulation runs. The standard error of the mean actual program
completion time is less than 0.4% of the estimate. For a fixed n, there is no significant
di↵erence in the projected program completion time when t varies, since the projected
program completion time is estimated by the assumption that the selected project
will progress in the sole-source phase at the same pace as in the competition phase.
However, the actual program completion time does depend on t. As seen in the next
column, the longer the competition phase t, the sooner the entire program completes.
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Table 2: The symmetric case, with each contractor’s maximal capable rate   = 8. A
project has m = 120 technical steps, and each contractor works at 100% of their maximal
capable rate (↵ = 0) in the competition phase. For each case, the results are based on 2,000
independent simulation runs, with the standard error of the mean program completion time
within 0.4% of the estimate.
Average Completion Progress at the Total Cost
n t Time (yrs) Delay (yrs) Deadline (%) (billions)
(yrs) Projected Actual Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
3 14.38 16.73 2.35 2.26 86.1 6.2 62.1 10.2
4 14.24 16.34 2.10 2.05 87.6 5.4 61.0 10.1
5 14.42 16.23 1.81 1.90 89.4 4.7 61.1 10.2
2 6 14.61 16.17 1.56 1.82 91.0 4.2 61.9 10.8
7 14.54 15.89 1.35 1.71 92.2 3.8 61.8 11.2
8 14.47 15.60 1.14 1.65 93.4 3.4 61.9 12.0
9 14.52 15.45 0.93 1.64 94.6 3.0 66.4 12.5
10 14.48 15.21 0.73 1.52 95.7 2.7 72.6 11.4
3 13.47 15.97 2.50 1.79 84.8 6.2 58.9 8.1
4 13.61 15.79 2.18 1.67 86.9 5.4 58.5 8.2
5 13.77 15.66 1.89 1.65 88.7 4.8 58.3 8.9
3 6 13.80 15.42 1.63 1.54 90.3 4.3 58.3 9.2
7 13.95 15.33 1.37 1.49 91.8 3.8 59.9 9.8
8 13.96 15.10 1.14 1.44 93.2 3.4 61.5 10.5
9 13.99 14.91 0.92 1.41 94.5 3.1 71.0 10.7
10 13.92 14.62 0.70 1.33 95.7 2.7 84.9 10.0
3 12.92 15.55 2.63 1.58 83.8 6.3 57.1 7.1
4 13.20 15.45 2.24 1.52 86.3 5.4 57.0 7.5
5 13.41 15.33 1.93 1.45 88.3 4.8 56.9 7.8
4 6 13.55 15.19 1.64 1.41 90.1 4.3 57.6 8.4
7 13.55 14.94 1.40 1.37 91.6 3.9 59.1 9.0
8 13.65 14.79 1.15 1.30 93.1 3.5 62.5 9.5
9 13.70 14.61 0.92 1.30 94.5 3.1 77.5 9.9
10 13.72 14.42 0.69 1.23 95.8 2.7 100.1 9.2
The main reason is that during the competition phase, each contractor works at their
maximal capable rate, but during the sole-source phase, the contractor works at a rate
to meet the scheduled deadline, which often results in delays.
The next two columns display the delay, in terms of its expected value and standard
deviation, assuming the selected project in the sole-source phase is funded through
completion. The delay is the di↵erence between the projected program completion
time and the actual program completion time. The shorter the competition phase
(t), the longer the delay, since there are more technical steps left for the selected
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contractor to complete in the sole-source phase. If we fix t, then the delay increases as
n increases, which appears to be counterintuitive at the first glance. To understand this
phenomenon, note that with more contractors in the competition phase, it becomes
more likely for one contractor to get lucky and accomplish more than they would
normally do, which leads the government to be overly optimistic about the contractor’s
capability. When the government overestimates the selected contractor’s capability, the
projected program completion time becomes unrealistically short; hence, the long delay.
The next two columns display the progress at the projected program completion
time, as percentage of the technical steps completed compared with the total required
m = 120. For instance, if the projected program completion time is 14.5 years, then
we run the simulation to determine how many technical steps are actually completed
in 14.5 years. If the contractor completes 111 technical steps in 14.5 years, then we
say the project is 111/m = 111/120 = 92.5% completed at the projected completion
time. This statistic and the delay have a negative correlation. The more work that is
completed at the projected completion time, the shorter the eventual delay.
The final two columns in Table 2 display the total program cost (in billions) until
the sole-source contractor completes the development of the new weapon system, based
on Equation (5). As seen in Table 2, for a fixed n, the total program cost increases,
if t is too small or too large. If t is too small, then the government does not benefit
much from the competition phase, when each contractor is motivated to work at their
maximal capable rate. The program completion time lengthens because of the long
sole-source phase, and therefore the total program cost. If t is too large, then the
program cost also increases, since the government has to fund multiple contractors in
the competition phase. As seen in Table 2, the optimal length of the competition phase
t, which minimizes the total program cost, tends to lie between 4 and 6 years.
The government has two objective functions: a small program completion time
and a small total program cost. Based on the results in Table 2, the e cient frontier
contains six (n, t) combinations, namely n = 4 and t = 5, . . . , 10. In other words,
the government should fund four independent contractors in the competition phase (if
possible) and then set the competition phase to be at least five years. However, since
as t increases from 5 to 10, the expected program completion time decreases slowly,
while the expected total program cost increases slowly for t = 5, 6, 7, but quickly for
t = 8, 9, 10, a strong argument can be made that the competition phase should be set
between 5 and 7 years. With t = 5 years, the program will cost less, but take longer to
complete; with t = 7 years, the program will cost more, but take less time to complete.
In practice, the choice of n may be limited to the state of the defense industry. For
instance, perhaps there are only two defense contractors that are capable of developing
the weapon system of interest, which will default n = 2. The recommendation would
also change, if the yearly program costs ci, i = 1, . . . , 15 vary from a weapon system
to another.
We next examine the possibility, if each contractor exerts more e↵ort in the com-
petition phase in order to increase their chances of getting selected as the sole source.
In some cases, the contractors are explicitly prohibited to do so, but in some other
cases such a practice is not inconceivable, since winning the sole-source contract often
translates to work for the contractor’s employees and huge profit. In our mathematical
model, we assume that in the competition phase, a contractor works at a rate equal to
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 (1 + ↵), where ↵ models the extra e↵ort. Table 3 displays the results for ↵ = 0.05,
and Table 4 displays the results for ↵ = 0.1.
Table 3: The symmetric case, with each contractor’s maximal capable rate   = 8. A project
has m = 120 technical steps and each contractor works at 105% of their maximal capable
rate (↵ = 0.05) in the competition phase. For each case, the results are based on 2,000
independent simulation runs, with the standard error of the mean program completion time
within 0.4% of the estimate.
Average Completion Progress at the Total Cost
n t Time (yrs) Delay (yrs) Deadline (%) (billions)
(yrs) Projected Actual Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
3 13.48 16.01 2.53 1.99 84.6 6.4 58.9 9.0
4 13.77 15.93 2.16 1.89 87.0 5.5 59.0 9.3
5 13.80 15.68 1.88 1.73 88.8 4.8 58.2 9.3
2 6 13.78 15.41 1.63 1.66 90.2 4.3 57.4 9.8
7 13.74 15.12 1.39 1.64 91.7 3.9 56.8 10.8
8 13.79 14.93 1.14 1.54 93.2 3.5 57.0 11.2
9 13.76 14.67 0.91 1.51 94.5 3.1 60.5 11.5
10 13.78 14.47 0.69 1.48 95.8 2.7 67.0 11.1
3 12.94 15.57 2.64 1.71 83.7 6.4 57.1 7.7
4 12.98 15.28 2.30 1.61 85.8 5.6 56.0 7.9
5 13.16 15.13 1.97 1.49 88.0 4.9 55.5 8.0
3 6 13.09 14.78 1.69 1.41 89.7 4.4 54.5 8.4
7 13.27 14.68 1.41 1.39 91.5 3.9 55.6 9.1
8 13.33 14.48 1.15 1.35 93.0 3.5 57.0 9.8
9 13.26 14.16 0.90 1.31 94.5 3.1 65.3 10.0
10 13.31 13.97 0.66 1.26 95.9 2.7 80.0 9.4
3 12.31 15.11 2.80 1.44 82.5 6.4 55.1 6.5
4 12.63 15.00 2.37 1.43 85.3 5.5 54.8 7.0
5 12.67 14.72 2.05 1.38 87.3 4.9 53.5 7.5
4 6 12.83 14.55 1.72 1.32 89.4 4.4 53.8 7.8
7 12.91 14.33 1.43 1.30 91.2 3.9 55.1 8.5
8 12.98 14.13 1.15 1.23 92.9 3.5 57.7 9.0
9 13.01 13.90 0.89 1.22 94.5 3.1 72.1 9.2
10 13.02 13.66 0.64 1.18 96.0 2.7 94.5 8.9
The same patterns observed in Table 2 are also observed in Tables 3 and 4. Across
the three tables, we see that as ↵ increases, both average projected completion time and
average actual completion time decrease, because the contractors tend to accomplish
more technical tasks in the competition phase. However, the average delay increases as
↵ increases, since after seeing the contractors making great progress in the competition
phase, the government becomes too optimistic and projects a unrealistic completion
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Table 4: The symmetric case with each contractor’s maximal capable rate   = 8. A project
has m = 120 technical steps, and each contractor works at 110% of its maximal capable rate
(↵ = 0.1) in the competition phase. For each case, the results are based on 2,000 independent
simulation runs, with the standard error of the mean program completion time within 0.4%
of the estimate.
Average Completion Progress at the Total Cost
n t Time (yrs) Delay (yrs) Deadline (%) (billions)
(yrs) Projected Actual Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
3 12.89 15.56 2.67 1.85 83.5 6.6 56.9 8.3
4 12.96 15.28 2.31 1.67 85.8 5.6 55.8 8.2
5 13.07 15.06 1.99 1.68 87.8 5.0 54.8 9.1
2 6 13.10 14.80 1.69 1.56 89.7 4.4 53.8 9.3
7 13.15 14.56 1.41 1.51 91.4 3.9 53.1 9.9
8 13.18 14.33 1.15 1.48 93.0 3.5 52.6 10.8
9 13.16 14.05 0.89 1.44 94.5 3.1 55.7 10.9
10 13.12 13.75 0.64 1.39 96.0 2.7 61.6 10.4
3 12.17 15.03 2.86 1.60 82.0 6.7 54.6 7.2
4 12.38 14.80 2.43 1.47 84.8 5.7 53.6 7.2
5 12.52 14.59 2.07 1.39 87.1 5.0 52.6 7.5
3 6 12.60 14.35 1.75 1.33 89.2 4.4 51.9 7.9
7 12.67 14.11 1.44 1.34 91.1 3.9 51.9 8.8
8 12.65 13.81 1.15 1.30 92.9 3.5 52.1 9.5
9 12.68 13.56 0.88 1.26 94.5 3.1 60.8 9.5
10 12.68 13.29 0.60 1.22 96.2 2.6 74.9 9.2
3 11.76 14.74 2.97 1.40 81.1 6.6 53.4 6.3
4 12.01 14.52 2.51 1.33 84.2 5.6 52.5 6.6
5 12.24 14.35 2.11 1.35 86.8 5.0 51.6 7.3
4 6 12.35 14.12 1.77 1.28 89.0 4.4 51.3 7.6
7 12.33 13.79 1.45 1.25 90.9 3.9 51.5 8.2
8 12.43 13.58 1.15 1.20 92.8 3.5 53.7 8.7
9 12.47 13.33 0.86 1.18 94.6 3.1 67.8 8.9
10 12.44 13.02 0.58 1.11 96.3 2.6 89.7 8.3
time. As a result, the progress at the projected deadline also drops.
As seen in the last two columns in Table 3 and 4, for a given number of contractors,
the optimal length of the competition phase that minimizes the total program cost
tends to lie between 5 and 8 years—longer than 4–6 years in the case ↵ = 0. Since the
contractor exerts more e↵ort in the competition phase, the government benefits more
from the extra e↵ort with a longer competition phase. Consequently, it is desirable for
the government to choose a longer competition phase. In practice, however, it is often
impossible for the government to verify whether the contractor exerts extra e↵ort in
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the competition phase. In those situations, it is reasonable to choose a competition
phase length that works well for di↵erent ↵ values. Based on Tables 2 to 4, setting
t = 5 or 6 appears to be sound policy choices.
6.3 The Case with Asymmetric Contractors
This section presents a numerical study, where the n contractors involved in the com-
petition phase have di↵erent maximal capable rates. We adopt the same model pa-
rameters in Section 6.2 with m = 120, and vary ↵ = 0, 0.05, 0.1. For n = 2, we set
 1 = 7.5 and  2 = 8.5. For n = 3, we add  3 = 8.
Table 5 displays the numerical results for ↵ = 0. For each case, the results are based
on 2,000 independent simulation runs, with the standard error of the mean program
completion time within 0.3% of the estimate. If two or more contractors complete the
same number of technical steps in the competition phase, then we assume that the
government will select a contractor at random.
Table 5: The asymmetric case, with  1 = 7.5,  2 = 8.5, and  3 = 8 (if applicable). A
project has m = 120 technical steps and each contractor works at 100% of their maximal
capable rate (↵ = 0) in the competition phase. For each case, the results are based on 2,000
independent simulation runs, with the standard error of the mean program completion time
within 0.3% of the estimate.
Average Completion Progress at the Total Cost
n t Time (yrs) Delay (yrs) Deadline (%) (billions)
(yrs) Projected Actual Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
3 14.08 16.38 2.30 2.38 86.2 6.2 60.6 10.7
4 14.08 16.09 2.01 2.10 88.0 5.4 59.8 10.3
5 14.21 15.94 1.72 1.95 89.7 4.7 59.6 10.5
2 6 14.35 15.82 1.47 1.92 91.3 4.2 59.9 11.4
7 14.32 15.58 1.27 1.81 92.5 3.8 59.8 11.9
8 14.26 15.31 1.05 1.74 93.8 3.4 59.8 12.7
9 14.19 15.04 0.85 1.68 94.9 3.0 63.2 12.8
10 14.22 14.87 0.65 1.59 96.0 2.7 70.0 11.9
3 13.24 15.71 2.47 1.84 84.8 6.3 57.7 8.3
4 13.50 15.60 2.10 1.78 87.2 5.4 57.6 8.8
5 13.67 15.48 1.80 1.69 89.1 4.8 57.4 9.1
3 6 13.71 15.26 1.55 1.60 90.7 4.3 57.3 9.5
7 13.78 15.08 1.30 1.51 92.2 3.9 58.3 9.9
8 13.80 14.87 1.08 1.50 93.5 3.5 59.8 10.9
9 13.77 14.62 0.85 1.45 94.8 3.1 68.8 11.0
10 13.88 14.53 0.65 1.44 96.0 2.7 84.2 10.8
Intuitively, the longer the competition phase, the more likely the government will
select the most-capable contractor—contractor 2 in our numerical study. This extra
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benefit makes it more attractive for the government to choose a longer competition
phase—a larger t. As seen in Table 5, for n = 2, the optimal length that minimizes the
total program cost is between t = 4 and 8 years. The program completion time still
decreases in t, as was the case in Section 6.2. Given an opportunity, the government
should involve n = 3 contractors, rather than just n = 2. In addition, setting t =
5, 6, 7, 8 remains an attractive choice to balance the program completion time and
total cost.
Tables 6 and 7 display the numerical results for ↵ = 0.05 and ↵ = 0.1, respectively,
for the asymmetric case. Similar qualitative observations can be made in these two
tables. Of course, the larger the value of ↵, the more technical steps each contractor can
complete in the competition phase, which drives down both program completion time
and total cost. The average delay lengthens as ↵ increases, since the government would
be too optimistic to predict the project completion time by assuming the project will
progress at the same pace in the sole-source phase, as was observed in the competition
phase. Finally, the optimal length of the competition phase, which o↵ers a great
balance between the program completion time and total cost, remains to be between
5 and 8 years.
Table 6: The asymmetric case, with  1 = 7.5,  2 = 8.5, and  3 = 8 (if applicable). A project
has m = 120 technical steps and each contractor works at 105% of their maximal capable
rate (↵ = 0.05) in the competition phase. For each case, the results are based on 2,000
independent simulation runs, with the standard error of the mean program completion time
within 0.3% of the estimate.
Average Completion Progress at the Total Cost
n t Time (yrs) Delay (yrs) Deadline (%) (billions)
(yrs) Projected Actual Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
3 13.32 15.78 2.45 2.12 84.9 6.6 57.9 9.6
4 13.54 15.62 2.09 1.97 87.3 5.6 57.5 9.7
5 13.54 15.34 1.80 1.84 89.0 4.9 56.4 9.9
2 6 13.63 15.15 1.52 1.77 90.7 4.3 55.9 10.5
7 13.55 14.84 1.29 1.68 92.1 3.9 54.9 11.0
8 13.60 14.66 1.05 1.60 93.6 3.5 55.0 11.6
9 13.61 14.44 0.83 1.57 94.9 3.1 58.7 11.9
10 13.52 14.13 0.61 1.50 96.2 2.7 64.5 11.3
3 12.66 15.26 2.60 1.78 83.7 6.6 55.6 8.0
4 12.88 15.09 2.21 1.65 86.2 5.6 55.1 8.1
5 13.08 14.96 1.89 1.61 88.4 5.0 54.6 8.7
3 6 13.10 14.69 1.59 1.58 90.2 4.4 53.9 9.4
7 13.08 14.42 1.34 1.47 91.8 3.9 53.9 9.6
8 13.15 14.22 1.07 1.45 93.4 3.5 55.1 10.6
9 13.15 13.98 0.83 1.38 94.8 3.1 64.0 10.5
10 13.16 13.76 0.60 1.33 96.2 2.6 78.5 10.0
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Table 7: The asymmetric case, with  1 = 7.5,  2 = 8.5, and  3 = 8 (if applicable). A
project has m = 120 technical steps and each contractor works at 110% of their maximal
capable rate (↵ = 0.1) in the competition phase. For each case, the results are based on
2,000 independent simulation runs, with the standard error of the mean program completion
time within 0.3% of the estimate.
Average Completion Progress at the Total Cost
n t Time (yrs) Delay (yrs) Deadline (%) (billions)
(yrs) Projected Actual Mean Std Mean Std Mean Std
3 12.79 15.36 2.57 1.98 83.9 6.7 56.0 8.9
4 12.90 15.10 2.19 1.88 86.3 5.8 54.9 9.2
5 12.88 14.76 1.88 1.75 88.3 5.0 53.2 9.4
2 6 12.96 14.54 1.58 1.67 90.2 4.5 52.3 9.9
7 12.93 14.25 1.32 1.62 91.8 4.0 51.1 10.6
8 12.89 13.94 1.05 1.55 93.4 3.5 49.8 11.3
9 12.93 13.73 0.80 1.50 95.0 3.1 53.3 11.4
10 12.86 13.41 0.55 1.39 96.4 2.6 59.1 10.4
3 12.08 14.86 2.78 1.65 82.4 6.7 53.9 7.4
4 12.29 14.62 2.33 1.55 85.3 5.7 52.8 7.6
5 12.41 14.38 1.97 1.49 87.6 5.0 51.4 8.0
3 6 12.49 14.13 1.65 1.43 89.7 4.5 50.6 8.5
7 12.52 13.88 1.36 1.39 91.5 4.0 50.4 9.1
8 12.59 13.67 1.08 1.38 93.2 3.5 51.1 10.0
9 12.59 13.39 0.80 1.33 94.9 3.1 59.5 10.1
10 12.56 13.11 0.54 1.27 96.5 2.6 73.6 9.5
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7 Conclusions
This report uses mathematical modeling to study a government program that develops
a technologically advanced weapon system. The government funds several contractors
to develop system prototypes in the competition phase and then selects one contractor
to develop the weapon system. The government can choose the number of contractors
involved in the competition phase and the length of the competition phase, with the
goal to minimize the program completion time and the total program cost.
Based on model analysis and numerical study, we identified three main reasons why
such a program often su↵ers delay and cost overrun.
1. At the end of the competition phase, the contractor that gets selected tends to
be the one that performs “luckier than usual.” Hence, the government tends to
be overly optimistic about the selected contractor’s actual ability.
2. In the sole-source phase, the goal of the contractor is to finish scheduled tasks in
each fiscal year on time, but not to deliver the final product as soon as possible.
Whenever the contractor is ahead of schedule, the contractor tends to slow down
in order to “meet” the yearly deadline. Since the R&D process involves a lot of
risk, slowing down whenever the project is going well often results in an eventual
delay and cost overrun.
3. It is conceivable that in order to improve their chance of winning the sole-source
contract, a contractor is motivated to exert extra e↵ort in the competition phase.
If that is the case, then using the accomplishment in the competition phase to
predict progress in the sole-source phase would produce an unrealistic estimation
on the program completion time.
The numerical study is based on a nominal project schedule of 15 years, with the
nominal yearly costs provided by N98. Using these numbers, we found that it is better
for the government to involve more contractors in the competition phase, if available.
The longer the competition phase, the shorter the program completion time; however,
the total program cost tends to increase if the competition phase is either too short or
too long. When the number of contractors in the competition phase is between 2 and
4, the optimal length of the competition phase typically lies between 5 and 8 years,
which o↵ers great balance between program completion time and total cost.
Our model assumes that the government announces the length of the competition
phase in advance and selects one contractor at the conclusion of the competition phase.
An alternative approach is to review each contractor’s progress on a yearly basis and
decide which contractors to fund for another year. In addition, if the government has
some prior knowledge about each contractor’s capability, then a Bayesian approach
may produce a more reliable estimate on the program completion time. A separate
study is needed to explore these issues.
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